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Abstract
A radiological dispersal event (RDE) is the result of a Radiological Dispersal
Device (RDD) or a dirty bomb. An RDD is a low‐yield conventional bomb surrounded
by radiological material (RM) such as Cesium‐137 or Cobalt‐60. Upon detonation,
the blast of the conventional explosive is designed to spread the RM over a wide
area. The RM will then be inhaled or ingested by people, or otherwise absorbed into
the environment.
An RDD is an affordable, feasible, and economically devastating option for
terrorist groups. Possible RM could be stolen or acquired cheaply from the millions
of radioactive sources used worldwide in industry, for medical purposes and in
academic applications.
The purpose of this research is to develop a generalized methodology that
can be used to assess economic impacts resulting from an RDE, occurring in any
location and across any industry. Currently there is no universal approach for
measuring the costs or economic impacts on businesses, nor a common framework
for estimating an economic impact of a radiological event, leading to inaccurate and
unverified estimates. The objective of this research is to aid in the RDE response
effort by providing government planners, officials, and key stakeholders with an
economic assessment tool which can be used to quantify the economic impacts
arising from a RDE, thereby facilitating the strategic decision making process.
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As part of the methodology, this thesis used an I‐O Model to evaluate the
economic impacts on a proposed study site representing a mid‐sized US city. The
methodology used in this study can be expanded and applied to other regions or
cities.
In applying the methodology to a case study location, this research identified
and quantified the district within the city with the largest impact, the Central
Business District. In addition, the study showed that the direct, indirect, and induced
costs remained consistent independent of the sector at approximately 60%, 15%,
and 25% respectively. The significance of such a finding is that previous attempts to
quantify the impact only measured the direct effects and thus did not capture
approximately 40% of the total costs. The maximal total 1‐year impact for an RDE in
the CBD is approximately $1.4 billion covering 860 firms in 270 distinct industries.
In addition, approximately 18,000 workers will be unemployed immediately
following the attack, with an additional 113,000 people affected by the shift in the
local economy as a result of indirect and induced effects.
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METHOD OF MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A RADIOLOGICAL
DISPERSAL EVENT WITHIN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT
I. Introduction
A radiological dispersal event (RDE) is the result of a Radiological Dispersal Device
(RDD) or a dirty bomb. Although in the same category as a nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapon, an RDD does not generate its power from splitting or fusing
atoms as a nuclear bomb does. This study used the standard convention that an RDD
is a low‐yield conventional bomb surrounded by radiological material (RM) such as
Cesium‐137 (Cs‐137) or Cobalt‐60 (Co‐60). Upon detonation, the blast of the
conventional explosive is designed to spread the RM over a wide area. The RM can
then be inhaled or ingested by people, or otherwise absorbed into the environment.

An RDD is an affordable, feasible, and economically devastating option for terrorist
groups. An RDD is affordable and feasible because possible RM could be stolen or
acquired cheaply from the millions of radioactive sources used worldwide in
industry, for medical purposes and in academic applications‐ mainly
research.(Frost, 2005) The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has estimated that
within the United States, approximately one RM source is lost, abandoned or stolen
every day of the year. (Ferguson, Kazi, & Perera, 2003) And, in a report to congress
in 2008, it was predicted that an RDD is likely to be used sometime before 2013.
(Graham & Talent, 2008)
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An RDE is ideally suited to the case of economic warfare in that it has the potential
to cause major local economic disruptions immediately and extend them over a
period of time.

The strategic placement of the device within an urban center will determine the
economic impact of the RDE. There are at least three economic centers within any
city that are possible targets for an RDE: the
industrial center(s), the retail area(s), and
the business district(s). This research uses
Dayton, Ohio as its model of a mid‐size
urban center. Within Dayton, one industrial
center is the General Motors manufacturing
Figure 11: RDE Fallout Area Moraine GM
Plant – Industrial Center (Google, Inc)

plant in Moraine (Figure 1‐1). There are a
number of retail areas within Dayton, but
the Fairfield Mall (Figure 1‐2) was selected
for this research based upon its size (it is a
major retail center) and proximity to key
secondary establishments: a military
installation, an airfield, and a major
university, all of which will be impacted

Figure 12: RDE Fallout Area Fairfield Mall 
Retail Center (Google, Inc)

negatively based on their proximity to the
fallout area. An urban environment may

have numerous business districts however, the Central Business District (CBD),
2

located in downtown Dayton, is the primary
business district for the Dayton Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA).
The CBD contains banks, corporate offices,
and service industries such as law firms and
accounting agencies. In general a CBD is
considered the heart of any MSA. (Figure 1‐3)

Figure 13: RDE Fallout Area Central Business
District  Commercial Center (Google, Inc)

According to the Center for American Progress, a team of nuclear researchers
concluded that terrorists are "all but certain" to set off a radiological weapon in the
United States (Grotto, 2005). Incidents over the last several years have supported
these concerns. In May 2003, the U.S. arrested an American, Jose Padilla, in
Chicago’s O’Hare airport for his involvement with Al Qaeda in planning a
radiological attack on the United States. In January 2003, British officials found
documents in the Afghan city of Herat indicating that Al Qaeda had successfully built
a small radiological explosive device and that they possessed training manuals on
how to employ it. (Gardner, 2003)

The RDE threat is real, and an actual radiological attack could occur on U.S. soil
within our lifetime. Government officials are already aware of the threat and, in a
document distributed to Congress, highlighted an RDE attack as one of a number of
viable threats that the government must be prepared to confront. (US Department of
Homeland Security, 2006)
3

The general public often misunderstands the nature of the RDE threat because of a
lack of credible information. Due to this misunderstanding, there is no shared
appreciation of the problem or how best to address it. The reality is that the threat
of a dirty bomb attack by terrorists is a credible one, though the economic impact of
an RDE was not properly measured in prior studies.

Therefore, this research seeks to measure the unknown: What is the economic
impact of an RDE on the retail, industrial and commercial regions of a mid‐sized
city?

Background and Research Purpose
Research on this topic was conducted previously, the most recent study was in
2009. That study began a first step in developing an approach to measuring the
direct, indirect, and induced economic effects of an RDE on retail businesses.
(LeBrun, 2009) The direct effect is the known or predicted change in the local
economy that is to be studied. The indirect effects are the business‐to‐business
transactions required to satisfy the direct effect. Finally, the induced effect is
derived from local spending on goods and services by people working to satisfy the
direct and indirect effects. Prior to LeBrun’s research in 2009, all attempts to
quantify the effects of an RDE only studied one portion of the economic impact, the
direct effect.
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Although the prior research was able to identify the three components of the
economic impact, the study was unable to obtain actual revenue data for the study
site. As such, the revenue was approximated based on square footage of the retail
stores. Using these approximations, it was calculated that the effect of an RDE within
the Fairfield Mall retail sector was approximately $1.2 billion. In contrast to
LeBrun’s work this study uses actual revenue data from 2007 for the Dayton MSA,
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to more accurately model the
economic impacts of an RDE for the three distinct economic sectors. In addition, this
research ultimately developed a methodology to calculate the maximal point of
economic impact among the three sectors, thereby facilitating local and regional
strategic decision‐making. This study used an input‐output model (I‐O Model) to
evaluate the direct, indirect, and induced costs of an RDE.

Results
In using the I‐O Model, it was discovered that in the wake of an RDE, the most
impacted sector is the CBD. (Figure 1‐4) In addition, the direct, indirect, and induced
costs remained consistent independent of the sector at approximately 60%, 15%,
and 25% respectively throughout the entirety of the MSA. The maximal total 1‐year
impact for an RDE in the CBD is approximately $1.4 billion (BY2007) covering 860
firms in 270 distinct industries. In addition, approximately 18,000 workers may be
unemployed immediately following the attack, with an additional 113,000 people
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affected with either lost wages or unemployment throughout the MSA as a result of
indirect and induced effects

Figure 14: Total 1Year Revenue Impact of RDE
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II. Literature Review

In March 2006, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed the
National Planning Scenarios, a strategic planning document outlining several key
threats and expected outcomes of such events in terms of lives lost, costs, and
impact to national infrastructure. The document describes the US government’s
plans for various disasters or attacks:
The Federal interagency community has developed 15 allhazards
planning scenarios (the National Planning Scenarios or Scenarios) for
use in national, Federal, State, and local homeland security
preparedness activities. The Scenarios are planning tools and are
representative of the range of potential terrorist attacks and natural
disasters and the related impacts that face our nation. The objective
was to develop a minimum number of credible scenarios in order to
establish the range of response requirements to facilitate preparedness
planning. (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006)

Scenario 11 of this document considers a Radiological Attack using a
Radiological Dispersal Device. The DHS estimated that 180 fatalities, 270
injuries and 20,000 instances of contaminations would occur, resulting in
10,000 people evacuated to shelters with an additional 25,000 people ordered
to shelter‐in‐place. In addition, hundreds of thousands voluntarily self‐
evacuate from urban areas in anticipation of future attacks. The direct effect
of an RDE was previously unknown but the best estimates analysts derive was
simply, “up to billions of dollars.” (US Department of Homeland Security,
2006, pp. 11‐1) The methodology used in the NPS 11 to generate this estimate
7

is not evident and does not appear to be based on any repeatable method.
Rather, it seems as if this estimate was derived from the aggregation of expert
opinion and is a best guess approximation. This estimate is unacceptable
when considering the feasibility of such an attack; it is simply executed, its
resources are easily available, and its impact widespread ‐ physically,
psychologically, and economically.

Perception and Economic Impact of the RDE Threat
In order to effectively model the economic impact of a RDE, it is necessary to
highlight previous research in the field, examine prior documentation of the
economic fallout from radiological events within mid‐sized cities. Fortunately, there
have not been any intentional radiological events within mid‐sized cities and the
number of unintentional events has been limited. In order to compensate for a lack
of real world events on which to base my analysis, a review of unintentional
radiological events as well as intentional conventional terrorist attacks was used as
a suitable proxy to determine the extent and range of a hypothetical RDE impact on
the economy.

Before one can begin to measure the effects of a RDE, one must understand what it
is. The Council on Foreign Relations classifies RDDs as weapons of mass destruction.
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2006) This term is applied because although such a
device would probably not result in a large number of deaths nor widespread
physical destruction, the device itself would create panic and disrupt the normal
8

functioning of society. Although in the same category as a nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapon, it is not a device that generates its power from splitting or fusing
atoms as a nuclear bomb would. In reality, a radiological dispersal device is a low‐
yield conventional device surrounded by radiological material such as Cesium‐137
(Cs‐137) or Cobalt‐60 (Co‐60). Upon detonation, the blast of the conventional
explosive spreads the radiological material over a wide area, which can then be
inhaled or ingested by people. Those who received a sufficient dose of this
radiological material may exhibit signs of radiation sickness such as nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, weakness, and even death, although the number of casualties is
expected to be small. Rather, the real impact of such an event is the isolation of
sections of the city for businesses. Sections of a city that are contaminated will be
isolated and businesses located within those sections will not be able to generate
revenue.

To date, there have been no successful incidents of radiological terrorism using dirty
bombs. There have been several notable radiological accidents and attempted
attacks on nuclear power plants. But there has not yet been a successful malicious
attack resulting in extensive destruction. Therefore, the physical (on humans and on
surrounding infrastructure), financial, environmental, psychological, and political
effects of a radiological terrorist attack cannot be fully grasped. Experience with
past radiological incidents, computer simulations, and terrorist attacks, were used
to estimate the physical and environmental impact based on known effects of
radiation, conventional bomb blasts, and other factors. This study developed a
9

repeatable method to model the economic impact of a RDD within a mid‐sized city
and generated estimates at three key locations.

“The economic impact of a radiological attack has the potential to be as devastating,
if not more, than the physical attack itself,” according to the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (2004), a private think‐tank group. LeBrun’s study (2009) of RDEs within
mid‐sized cities seems to support this statement. For one dirty bomb detonated
within a retail sector the total cost of lost revenue and employment was calculated
at nearly $1.2 billion (BY03). This study, however, did not consider decontamination
or reconstruction costs, but examined the loss of revenue and employment. The
aftermath of a RDE could include treating and decontaminating victims, evacuating
and relocating people from the affected area, decontaminating both the interior and
exterior, or completely demolishing affected buildings, safely discarding the
radioactive debris, decontaminating the emergency vehicles used in the
decontamination process, and many other activities. These efforts alone could cost
billions of dollars. (Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, 2004)

During the decontamination process, buildings in the affected area may not be
functional. Residents would likely have to be relocated. Businesses may have to do
the same or simply halt their activities until completion of the decontamination.
Depending on the nature of the business conducted inside those buildings, the
regional and national economy could be negatively impacted. U.S. Federal
10

guidelines, issued by the EPA in 2009, recommended reducing the cancer risk from
remaining radiation to low levels by abandoning the contaminated area or
demolishing buildings, but this decision rests largely with leaders in the local
community who would take into consideration the costs of clean up, the value of the
contaminated property, and the health and disruptive effects on people’s lives.
(Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
2004) For an affected area in the middle of a mid‐size city, such as Dayton, OH,
abandonment could cause thousands of people to lose their homes, jobs, and
schools. Buses and other transportation systems might require re‐routing. Even if
the area can be decontaminated to the levels required by Federal guidelines, the
psychological perception of increased radioactivity in the area could have its own
economic impact.

One of the most significant consequences of a radiological attack may be the
resulting psychological anxiety. Because most people are unfamiliar with
radiological terrorism, they may mistake a dirty bomb attack for a nuclear weapon
attack. The general public's fear of radiation could likely cause mass panic after a
release of radiation from an attack on a nuclear facility or the detonation of a
radiological device, further exacerbating the economic impact. Additionally,
hospitals may be overrun with people complaining of and possibly showing
symptoms of radiation sickness, even if they were nowhere near the attack site or
the radioactive fallout, as was the case in Brazil. In this example, 250 people were
actually exposed to a radioactive substance, but once it became public, 135,000
11

requested screening for exposure and 5000 people showed psychosomatic
symptoms of nausea and skin rashes mimicking symptoms of actual exposure but
were not ever exposed. These symptoms were caused strictly by the anxiety of
potential exposure.(Warwick, 2001) Such false reporting would create congestion
in the healthcare system in the local area, delaying treatment to those who may be
affected. Some people may experience increased levels of stress and anxiety.
Perceptions of continuing contamination might lead residents to move to other
areas causing a significant drop in home values and real estate, further impacting
the economy. Potential tourists might be dissuaded from visiting the affected area or
city. Some may become fearful of more terrorist attacks and refrain from visiting
any highly trafficked or densely populated areas, adding to the negative economic
impact of the attack. A resulting decrease in the area's real estate prices, tourism,
and commercial transactions could have long‐term negative effects on the area's
economy. These effects are beyond the scope of this study, but should be evaluated
in further studies.

To quantify these negative effects, it is necessary to valuate the individual costs of
such an event. After an RDE attack, there will be economic loss due to forfeited
revenue from local businesses affecting not just their consumers, but their suppliers
as well. These effects can be measured using an I‐O Model to estimate the total
losses in business and employment based on the losses of individual business. The
Input‐Output Model is a detailed accounting system of inter‐industry activities
within a local economy and it is based on the economic theory that the output of one
12

industry is an input to other industries. (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2009) The
Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) software uses this theory to develop a Social
Accounting System to describe transactions that occur between producers and
intermediate and final consumers. (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2009)
Because Social Accounting Systems examine all the aspects of a local economy, they
provide a more complete and accurate “snapshot” of the economy and its spending
patterns. (McIntosh, 1997, p. 15) In addition, IMPLAN is able to derive a multiplier
model mathematically using the I‐O Model and Social Accounting System.

The Multiplier Model is what gives IMPLAN its predictive ability in economic impact
analysis. (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2009) Once there is a clear
picture of the economy through the Social Accounting and Multipliers, its behavior
can be predicted for a defined event: if Company X spent 20% of its earnings on
widgets in 2006, then received an additional $1,000,000 of income from a new
project in 2007, the widget industry could expect to make approximately $200,000
more that year. If 5% of the widget producer’s industry is spent on steel, the steel
industry could expect $10,000 more; and so on. However, at each of these steps,
each company will source some products out of the region of the economy of study.
These are the losses that occur and eventually drive the cycle to zero. The total
increase in economic activity from a $1 million project is the economic impact of the
project; $1,000,000 spent became at least $1,210,000 of economic activity giving
Company X a multiplier of 1.21 ‐ every dollar spent on Company X creates 1.21
dollars of economic activity. (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2009)
13

Clean up, demolition, and reconstruction costs are beyond the scope of this research
and cannot be quantified by an input‐output model; however, the costs are
estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Reconstruction and clean up after the
terrorist attack of September 11 on the World Trade Center cost approximately $16
billion according to the Executive Director of the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, Chris Ward. With 1.5 million tons of debris removed, at a cost of $16
billion, the cost is approximately $10,700 per ton of debris removed after a terrorist
attack. This is, of course, simply a rough estimate and may vary widely based on
geographic region, but will be another cost in addition to the loss of employment
and revenue.

In order to effectively model the economic impact of an RDE, it is necessary to
examine the economic impact of previous similar events. Since detailed studies of
economic impacts resulting from radiological terrorism are scarce, comparable
studies such as the adverse affects of natural and manmade disasters on an area’s
economy, as well as conventional terrorist attacks will be examined in order to
provide a framework from which we can measure the accuracy of the final model
developed from IMPLAN.

Benefits of Economic Analysis
Conducting economic analysis after terrorist attacks or localized disasters provides
emergency managers an ability to gauge the severity of the damage and the funding
14

required to be able to provide assistance at all levels (City, State, Federal). The
Federal Emergency Management Agency is the largest and most visible branch of
emergency managers and is at the highest level. Because of the impact and RDE
would have both economically and psychologically, it is expected that the President
will declare a disaster for affected regions. The declaration of a disaster or
emergency by the president enables special funding as well as special rules for
sourcing the recovery and reconstruction efforts. In the immediate aftermath of a
disaster, cost estimates must be conducted to determine the extent of damage and
are required to be accurate to 10% within 90 days after the declaration of disaster
in accordance with federal guidelines. (United States General Accountability Office
(GAO), 2008) However, in order to make funds available during the fiscal year,
estimated costs are submitted to be included in the congressional appropriations
process for the next FY budget. FEMA uses the 5‐year annual average level of
obligations for past disasters, adjusted for inflation, as its estimate of the total cost
of disasters anticipated to occur during the current fiscal year. To estimate when
during the year the disasters will occur, FEMA simply allows the 5‐year annual
average to decline at a constant rate (8 percent) each month during the fiscal year.
“Using this approach, FEMA estimates that disasters costing about $500 million will
occur in August and September 2000. However, these months represent the height
of the hurricane season, and over the last 5 years, the average cost for disasters to
FEMA has been twice this amount,” (United States General Accountability Office,
2000) and as such, they are regularly underestimating the cost of disaster events,
forcing the agency to request additional funds from Congress.
15

Case Studies:
Conventional Terrorist Attack: Sept. 11, 2001 World Trade Center Attack
After September 11, 2001, it was predicted that New York City and the nation would
continue to suffer the economic ramifications of the terrorist attack for years to
come. (William C. Thompson, 2002) Because of this, a team of economists and
budget analysts from the office of the Comptroller studied the financial impact of the
September 11 attacks on the economy of New York City. The estimated economic
loss was calculated by “one‐time wealth loss and a continuing loss in jobs and Gross
City Product (GCP).” (William C. Thompson, 2002) Wealth includes both fixed
capital (buildings, infrastructure) and human capital (labor market). The
Comptroller estimated the impact of the World Trade Center attacks on the city's
wealth as $30.5 billion, of which $21.8 billion is the cost to replace lost buildings,
infrastructure and tenant assets and $8.7 billion is an estimate of the present value
of the future earnings of those who died. (William C. Thompson, 2002) Real GCP
losses by calendar year were $27.3 billion for the period from September 2001
through September 2002. (William C. Thompson, 2002)

Despite these tragic losses, the loss of lives and property on 9/11 was not large
enough to have had a measurable effect on the productive capacity of the United
States even though it had a very significant localized effect on New York City. In a
national sense, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was low in the first half of 2001
(Makinen, 2002), data published in October showed that GDP had contracted during
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the third quarter and positive growth resumed in the fourth quarter. This would
suggest that any effects from 9/11 on demand were short lived at the national level.
This finding validates the decision to limit the scope of this research to remain at the
local level, simply because,
“…for [a terrorist attack] to affect the economy it would have had to
have affected the price of an important input, such as energy, or had an
adverse effect on aggregate demand via such mechanisms as consumer
and business confidence, a financial panic or liquidity crisis, or an
international run on the dollar.” (Makinen, 2002)

It could be argued that a dirty bomb will affect aggregate demand via psychological
impact on the consumer. However, such an outcome is unlikely and ultimately the
impact will not be large enough to halt the growth of the national economy.
Although the GDP may show a slight change in the growth rate, as was the case after
9/11, the affects at the national level will most likely be very brief and minor. The
more likely outcome will be a compounding of the economic impact at the local
level.

Accidental Manmade RDE: Goiania, Brazil
In 1987, one of the most serious radiological accidents in history occurred in
Goiania, Brazil (International Atomic Energy Agency, September 1988). The
consequences of this event provide a baseline for possible economic impacts that
could be experienced from a terrorist attack using radiological material. In the case
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of Goiania, the RDE was a result of improper handling of abandoned medial
equipment, and was composed of Cs‐137. The Cs‐137 was acquired from an
abandoned radiation‐therapy unit after the doctor relocated his practice. According
to nuclear weapons expert John Pike (2002), Cs‐137 would be the most likely
material used in the assembly of a dirty bomb, because it is very easy to obtain and
can be found in “low‐level waste from medical or research labs, or welding shops
and construction sites” (Boyle, 2002). In the specific case of Goiania, two people
entered the premises and, not knowing what the unit was, removed the source
assembly, took it home, and dismantled it, subsequently rupturing the capsule that
housed the radioactive material. Environmental contamination resulted due to the
unintentional dispersal of the material, resulting in 249 people externally irradiated,
129 people internally contaminated, and 4 deaths (International Atomic Energy
Agency, September 1988)

As a result of the Goiania accident the region suffered a huge economic loss as well
as a lasting psychological impact on the local population. The fear of exposure to
radiation, irradiation, and incurable damage to health caused more than 200
residents to evacuate from the area. (International Atomic Energy Agency,
September 1988) Additionally, the inhabitants were discriminated against because
of the misunderstood nature of radiation. Sales of cattle, cereals and agricultural
produce, as well as cloth and cotton products (the main economic products of the
area) fell by 25% in the period after the accident. (International Atomic Energy
Agency, September 1988, p. 115) Ultimately, the cost of six months worth of
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intensive cleanup, which required seven houses and several buildings to be
demolished, amounted to $27.2 million. However, the indirect costs due to negative
economic repercussions were estimated to be as high as hundreds of millions of
dollars. The GCP for Goiania decreased by 20% and did not recover to pre‐RDE
levels for an additional five years. (Sohier & Hardeman, 2006, p. 175)

Psychological Impacts of Accidental RDE: Three Mile Island
In 1979, a partial core meltdown of a pressurized water reactor at the Three Mile
Island Nuclear Generating Station became the most significant accident in the
history of the American commercial nuclear power generating industry. It resulted
in the release of 13 million curies of radioactive noble gases (primarily xenon) and
13‐17 curies of Iodine‐131 into the atmosphere. The accident began with failures in
the non‐nuclear secondary system, followed by a stuck‐open pilot‐operated relief
valve in the primary system, which allowed large amounts of reactor coolant to
escape into the environment. As a result of this disaster there were short‐term and
long‐term economic losses despite relatively harmless nature of the noble gases and
the minor amount of Iodine‐131. No significant level of radiation was ever noted
outside of the TMI facility. (Walker, 2004)

Short‐term costs of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident were largely a result of the
evacuation of the surrounding area. 144,000 people within a 15‐mile radius of TMI
were displaced at a cost of $18 million (Flynn, 1979). In addition, there were other
health costs related to TMI. Although the level of radiation was considered too low
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to cause any increase in cancer rates, public heath was affected. There was an
increase in the number of workdays lost due to fear of radiation poisoning, as well
as an increase in the number of people presenting to the hospitals for treatment.
Anti‐anxiety medication was prescribed more frequently to help relieve the stress of
exposure. Some patients even began experiencing the signs and symptoms of
radiation sickness, although they were not exposed. (Flynn, 1979, p. 38)
Additionally, businesses were affected in the short‐term simply because of the loss
of production during the first week after the incident. Manufacturing plants self
reported revenue losses of approximately $7.7 million while non‐manufacturing
plants lost $74.2 million. These losses would have been much higher if not for $180
million in government aid for clean‐up and economic development.

The long‐term economic impact was not as severe and is harder to quantify.
Evidence from previous studies conducted by Gamble and Downing in 1981 and
Evans in 1981 show that sales of single family homes within a 25‐mile radius of TMI
before and after the accident remained consistent with no measurable affects either
positive or negative. The long‐term costs of cleaning and maintaining the power
plant while not in operation is approximately $1 billion, in addition to purchasing
power from out‐of‐state companies at higher rates. All these costs, however, are still
miniscule when examined from a macro‐perspective on the US as a whole. RDE
events are significant to the local area and will devastate a region, but will be
isolated to the local level.
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Accidental Manmade RDE: Chernobyl
The Chernobyl nuclear accident imposed huge costs on the former Soviet Union and
three successor countries; Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Although
these three countries bore a significant portion of the impact, the spread of
radiation across the borders of the USSR forced other countries such as Norway,
Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands to sustain economic losses as well.
Chernobyl is, on a grand scale, what can happen with a terrorist‐detonated RDE.
Although a portable RDE will not be as big nor as devastating as Chernobyl, an
attack on a nuclear power plant to incite an intentional meltdown could be as large
as Chernobyl. In this regard, the events and costs from Chernobyl can provide us an
upper limit in our cost estimates and economic impact models. The costs related to
Chernobyl vary in scope, but the 30‐year cost was estimated by the IAEA in a report
to the United Nations at $235 billion for Belarus alone. (International Atomic Energy
Agency, 2006, p. 33) Some of the direct costs are related to clean‐up, healthcare, and
radiation monitoring for the area. However, because the events of Chernobyl
required removal of agricultural land and forests from use and closure of nearby
agricultural and industrial facilities, there is also an indirect cost and lost
opportunity to use the land and facilities. (International Atomic Energy Agency,
2006, p. 32) 330,000 people within a thirty‐kilometer radius were evacuated and
resettled, most of whom were farmers. Once removed from the land they were
unable to work or get different jobs because of a social stigma associated with the
event. Even as late as 2003, wages tended to be lower and unemployment higher
within the regions affected by Chernobyl. Additionally, restrictions on agricultural
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production crippled the market for foodstuffs and other products from the affected
area. As a result, agriculture revenues have declined, production was reduced
drastically, and some facilities have shutdown. In Belarus, where some of the best
arable land was removed from production, the whole economy has struggled. There
seems to be no end in sight as continued environmental monitoring and government
aid is required in order to protect and sustain the populace. These costs ranged from
6% to 22% of the GDP, (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2006, p. 32) and
continue to have a stranglehold in developing future growth for Belarus, Ukraine
and Russia.

RDE Study: Port of Los Angeles
In 2005 a study was conducted on the economic impacts associated with a RDE in
the twin ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, California. This study addressed the
effects of a terrorist‐induced RDE. (Gordon, Moore, Richardson, & Pan, 1 May 2005,
p. 25) Gordon and his economics team at the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis
of Terrorism Events (CREATE) identified major United States ports as attractive
targets for terrorists, for three reasons: First, they can be accessed by land, air, and
sea; second, they are difficult to secure; third, RDEs can be shipped in and detonated
upon arrival at the port – no need for extraneous personnel as the device is being
transported by the freight company. Furthermore, major ports enable terrorists to
achieve one of their most important goals ‐ maximum economic damage. Ports need
to utilize several forms of transportation, including roads, railways, and waterways
to ensure the volume of goods shipped to the US are moved expeditiously. The
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closure of a port due to a dirty bomb attack for even a few days could have a severe
impact on the supply chain of hundreds or even thousands of companies.(Gordon,
Moore, Richardson, & Pan, 1 May 2005, p. 11)

Rosoff and von Winterfeldt (2007) conducted follow‐on research by providing a risk
and economic analysis of dirty bomb attacks on the ports. The economic analysis
conducted measured vehicular traffic flow from the major roads and rail lines that
bisect through the harbor as a proxy to measure revenue lost. This was the first
attempt to quantify economic impact at a smaller level than the GCP. They
determined a range of economic impacts due to a shutdown of the harbors based
upon the duration of the shutdown. For a short‐term (15‐day) shutdown, the impact
was relatively minor at only $300 million, because most ships would wait out the
closure and businesses could be resupplied in the short term from local vendors.
Medium and long‐term shutdowns due to the contamination resulted in significant
losses ($63 and $252 billion, respectively), including decontamination costs, as well
as business and property losses. The potential for an extended shutdown of
operations (or the amount of time when the economy will be unable to function) is
stated by Rosoff to be one of the major concerns of an RDE threat to the L.A. ‐ Long
Beach ports, simply because the longer the ports are not operating, the greater the
effects will be on the local, state, and perhaps national economies. (Rosoff &
Winterfeldt, 2007, p. 542) Rosoff validates the notion of how businesses within the
port area could possibly suffer economic losses due to the stigma of having their
companies located within a contamination zone. Depending on the amount of
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commerce that takes place within the area, the costs of business disruptions could
be large, certainly in the billions of dollars, but only if one assumes the majority of
businesses relocate outside of the region or cease to exist.(Rosoff & Winterfeldt,
2007, p. 543) The psychological aspect of contamination could have the ability to
cause patrons and residents to leave the area and not return, thus causing the
economic effects of the RDE.

Summary
The effect of an RDE is a massive impact into a local economy. Previous research has
given various ranges of the impact based on size, location, and severity of
contamination. However, all prior studies either used the change in the GCP or
proxies to estimate the economic impact. The limitation of the GCP is that it is
reactionary. The earliest indications of actual lost revenue will be in quarterly GCP
reports and will require multiple reports to show and isolate trends and changes.
These products are a good way to identify actual revenue lost but are unable to
provide estimates if needed before the report is published. Other studies used
proxies such as vehicular traffic or revenue per square foot to estimate revenue loss
for an area. This method of using proxies is able to produce estimates sooner than
the GCP reports, these estimates are only as robust as the proxy used in an estimate,
which may not reflect the actual revenue loss that could occur.
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III. Methodology

Modeling the economic impact of an RDE required a number of critical assumptions,
generalized systems of organization, a systematic approach to calculating the results
and in the end, I had a number of limitations that the model was unable to capture.

Assumptions
There were a number of assumptions made in the course of this research ranging
from the size of the area affected by the RDE to the RM used in the construction of
the RDD. Additionally, assumptions were made regarding factors related to
economies of scale within the city and location factors related to each site. These
assumptions allowed for the creation of an effective modeling system to measure
and capture the effects of an RDE within an urban environment. Using MSA data and
adjusting the number of firms and types of industries within the impact zone this
methodology can be applied to any metropolitan area within the US for any size
RDE.

Size of Impact
In accordance with National Planning Scenario 11, 97% of the fallout of 2,300
curries of Cs‐137 RDE will fall within a 36‐block or 1‐mile (diameter) area. (US
Department of Homeland Security, 2006) In following the NPS example, my
assumptions are:
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•

As a result of the explosions, 90% of the 2,300‐curies Cs‐137 source is
aerosolized and carried by winds, with radioactive particles ranging in
size from 1 to 150 microns. The remaining fallout creates debris and
contaminates surrounding structures.

•

All businesses within the 1‐mile area are closed for an extended duration
while radioactive contamination is remediated.

•

There is no precipitation. There are light, variable winds of 3 to 8 mph.
The temperature is 65°F.
o This assumption is critical, as weather factors will change the shape
and size of the contamination area within the study site. Because of an
assumption of good weather with little wind, the distribution of
contamination will be circular.

This research is predicated on the assumption that NPS Scenario 11 is accurate in its
assumptions regarding the size of the area affected and the resulting procedures to
cleanup and decontaminate the surrounding area.

Type of Radiological Material Used
Generally, the most hazardous radioactive materials are found in nuclear power
plants and sites where nuclear weapons are made and security is high. As a result,
obtaining materials from these areas would be extremely difficult, although not
impossible. Radioactive material could be obtained on the black market from North
Korea, Iran or even Pakistan, all of which have well‐financed nuclear development
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programs. However, according to John Pike, Nuclear Weapons Expert and Director
of Global Security, it would be more likely that radioactive materials for use in an
RDD would be obtained from low‐level waste such as medical or research labs (i.e.
diagnostic procedures, cancer treatments), or welding shops and construction sites
(i.e. industrial radiography). (Boyle, 2002)

Therefore, for the purposes of the current study, it is assumed that the simulated
RDD will contain Cs‐137, since this radioactive isotope is one of two (Cobalt‐60
being the other) elements most commonly used within industrial and commercial
sources. Experts also believe that this material will be the most likely substance
used in the event of a possible RDE. (Boyle, 2002)

Economies of Scale
Economies of scale are the cost advantages that a business obtains due to expansion
resulting in a producer’s average cost per unit to fall as scale is increased. Any size
firm expanding its scale of operation may utilize economies of scale. The most
common advantages a firm may experience by increasing its scale are: purchasing
(bulk‐buying of materials through long‐term contracts), managerial (increasing the
specialization of managers), financial (obtaining lower‐interest charges when
borrowing from banks and having access to a greater range of financial
instruments), and marketing (spreading the cost of advertising over a greater range
of output in media markets).
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This research generated two working models under two different assumptions. The
first model was a baseline model, with no economies of scale. Small firms and large
firms produce the same revenue per employee for a given industry. In the second
model, a more dynamic model, economies of scale were considered but are assumed
to be linear in order to simplify the analysis; however other geometric distributions
can be considered if needed. The slope of the revenue line is constant and the area
under the curve provides total revenue. This allowed for an accounting of the effects
of economies of scale while maintaining a degree of flexibility within the model.
Actual economies of scale vary widely from linear to exponential depending on the
individual firm. (Clark, 1984) Although not perfect in its model of actual economies
of scale, the linear approximation is sufficient in its ability to reflect the revenue lost
to an RDE as a generalized economy of scale applicable to the MSA as a whole and
demonstrate the need to consider the effects economies of scale have on the total
effect. The accuracy lost is not substantial enough to warrant the added
complication of more complex economies of scale.

Urban Economics and Location Factors
Urban economics is defined as the study of allocation of scarce resources across an
urban space. As such, it involves using the tools of economics to analyze their
relation to the urban environment and additionally, how the urban environment
affects the decision of producers and consumers with regards to location selection,
production and consumption.
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The three sites selected within Dayton are unique in certain regards. The CBD in
particular accounts for a larger proportional share of revenue than other business
districts located outside of the city center. As such, the CBD will have a larger
proportion of revenue when compared with other business districts (Blair & Carroll,
2009) and this should be accounted for when attempting to generalize this
methodology to other areas or other regions.

Upon examination of the MSA‐level data, assuming the industries found in the CBD
are consistent throughout all business districts within Dayton, the CBD holds
approximately 15% of all business district type firms in relation to the MSA and
conducts nearly 12.5% of the revenue when compared to the MSA in those specific
industries; however, of the three major business areas within the MSA, the revenue
of the CBD is 50% above average. The Fairfield Mall area contained 8% of firms
when compared with other mall type industries while accounting for 17.84% of the
total revenue. When compared with the average revenue from the five major malls
within the MSA, Fairfield was nearly 30% above the average. The Moraine GM plant
area contains 3% of all firms in relation to the MSA when compared to those specific
industries, but conducts 18.4% of the revenue for industrial‐type sectors when
compared to the industrial area industries found throughout the MSA. Moraine
additionally conducts 67% more revenue then the average when compared with the
other four other industrial sites within the MSA. However, because of the selection
of the three largest locations of their respective type within the MSA, this provides
decision makers the worst case scenario and can justify the exclusion of location
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factors from this study. Ultimately, as a limitation of the model, a key assumption
made is that all firms generate equal revenue indifferent to the location of the firm
within the MSA.

Data Distribution
In order to effectively analyze the results of the model, the distributions of the
effects (direct, indirect, and induced) were analyzed. The results appear to follow a
beta distribution. Although each industry within each of the districts examined may
have other revenue distributions, each of the effects for the districts must be
analyzed in order to develop a proper range of confidence of the effect.

Systems of Organization & Analysis
In order to effectively model a complex urban environment, a system for organizing
and analyzing the different industries is required. For this research, the North
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) was used to organize the MSA
data into industry specific groups, while the Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN)
software is used to develop the analysis of the dataset.

North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
Prior to creating the I‐O Model, all businesses within the MSA must first be industry
coded. This is an important step because IMPLAN measures impacts on individual
industries, not individual businesses. Industry coding may be accomplished through
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the use of NAICS. NAICS is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in
classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and
publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy.

IMPLAN IO Modeling
The Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) software application was used to
generate multipliers in order to measure the direct, indirect and induced effects of
the RDE on the economy’s output and employment. Multipliers are a numeric way of
describing the direct, indirect, and induced impact of a change. An employment
multiplier of 1.8 would suggest that for every 10 employees hired in the given
industry, 18 total jobs (in all sectors) would be added to the given economic region.
(McIntosh, 1997) The IMPLAN I‐O Model is suitable for analyzing this research in
that it provides the user with region‐specific economic data of each branch of
economic activity within an area’s financial system. The program computes
multipliers (direct, indirect and induced) for any given industry in any given
location, based on regional industrial composition (Social Accounting Matrix) and
geographic area. A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) represents flows of all economic
transactions that take place within an economy (regional or national). It is, at the
core, a matrix representation of the measured economic activity for a given country,
but can be extended to include non‐national accounting flows, and created for whole
regions or areas. By simulating a “shock” to any industry or multiple industries of an
economy (i.e. an RDE), the user can see how that impact ripples throughout the
user‐specified local economy.
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Recent economic data collection improvements made by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, U.S. Census Department, and other governmental and private
organizations have made the I‐O Model one of the most important, popular and
accurate methods for measuring the economic impacts on a region due to exogenous
or endogenous policy and economic changes. (Cheng, Stough, & Kocornik‐Mina,
2006) I‐O Models have been successfully applied in other economic disruption
estimations, such as electric power outages (Rose, Oladosu, & Liao, 1997),
hypothetical earthquakes (Okuyama, Hewings, Kim, Boyce, Ham, & Jungyul, 1999)
and hurricanes (Lamb, 1995).

Procedures and Methods
This research used IMPLAN to model the economic impact of a simulated RDE in an
urban center. The economic impact was estimated by the calculated loss of
employment and revenue using IMPLAN’s internal I‐O Model. National Planning
Scenario 11 determines the size of the affected area for fallout to be within 1‐mile of
the detonation. (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006) Businesses affected
within the proposed study sites were identified by their NAICS code. Employment
and annual revenue was collected for each industry identified and located within the
study sites. Results of the I‐O Model included direct, indirect, and induced economic
effects in terms of revenue and employment lost. Economic impacts for each of the
three proposed study sites was measured over a 1‐year period.
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This methodology can be generalized to other cities and counties by recreating the
steps outlined below or can even be roughly approximated by the use of the results
applied to the location quotients for Dayton compared to location quotients for
other cities. The end result of such a study will be a demonstration of the magnitude
and severity of a radiological device to any economic center as well as to show
which areas (commercial, retail, or industrial) within a city may be more likely to be
targeted. Targeting of specific sites will be analyzed for the 1‐year total impact
beginning at different periods throughout the year by applying industry specific
seasonal factors. The seasonal factors will show how effects on the economy can
change over the course of a year, and as a result, which months will lead to the most
immediate impact of an RDE for a given site.

Proposed Study Site Selection
The first step of the methodology is locating study sites distinct from each other but
within the same MSA to be able to differentiate results within a city. Additionally, in
order to select a viable location, it is important to understand why terrorists commit
the acts that they do. According to Club de Madrid, terrorist acts are typically
motivated by psychological, political, religious, cultural, or economic reasons. (Club
de Madrid, 2005) Terrorists also prefer to conduct their destructive operations in
high‐visibility; public areas where they can be witnessed by as many people as
possible (Center for Non Proliferation Studies, 2004)
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Since this study looks to assess the economic impacts of a terrorist act (RDE), the
three proposed study sites used within this research were based on their primary
industry, with each site addressing a specific revenue generating sector:
commercial, industrial, and retail. These sites will be used to show not only a
comparison between the different industries and district compositions of the effects
of an RDE but to highlight as a case study how such an analysis can be completed for
any district of any MSA.

For the commercial sector, the Dayton Central Business District (CBD) was selected.
The site of the CBD contains banks, corporate offices, and service industries such as
law firms insurance and brokerage companies, and accounting agencies and is
generally considered the heart of any MSA. The Industrial sector is represented by
the Moraine GM plant, which until 2008 was operating at full capacity, producing a
number of different GM cars, trucks and SUVs. Although the plant has since been
closed, the revenue and employment data used is from 2007 and matches with
IMPLAN input‐output model whose social matrix is based on 2007 data; this is not a
limiting factor as all results will be in BY 2007 dollars for comparison and modeling
purposes. The final site of study is a retail sector. Although there are a number of
different retail centers in and around Dayton, the Fairfield Mall was selected
because of its size, proximity to several major roads and government facilities
(Wright‐Patterson AFB)
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Create a Map Overlay
The next step was to determine what
commerce was affected by the RDE.
Since the National Planning Scenarios
indicate a majority (90%) of the fallout
to be contained within 1‐mile, a series of
concentric circles is superimposed onto
an aerial photomap of the impacted area,

Figure 31: RDE Fallout Area Moraine GM
Plant – Industrial Center

in order to provide a clearer picture as to which business areas within the economy
were directly affected with possible contamination. The image was placed over the
mapping application based on the locations selected. In order to assist with the
identification of local area business, the selected areas were forwarded to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which has compiled data by zip code. This data was
further refined to the 1‐mile area by the BLS upon request.

Figure 32: RDE Fallout Area Fairfield Mall 
Retail Center

Figure 33: RDE Fallout Area Central Business
District  Commercial Center
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Data Collection
Once the affected businesses were identified, the next step was to identify the
economic parameters necessary to calculate the economic impacts. For the
purposes of this research, annual revenues and employment data were used. This
information was collected by the BLS and available in a number of sources
including:
•

US Census Bureau 2007 Economic Census (US Census Bureau, 2010)

•

BLS County Business Patterns (2007): Employment and Business Data (United
States Department of Labor, 2010)

•

American Fact Finder: Economic Patterns (US Census Bureau, 2010)

The BLS further refined the data to the 6‐level NAICS identifier; data collected from
online sources will be masked at such a high level of fidelity and was unmasked
upon special request. Revenue data was only able to be collected at the MSA level
and would need to be scaled down in order to estimate revenue generated within
each of the three study sites.

Scaling Annual Revenue
The annual revenue data necessary to conduct the economic impact analysis was
easily collected for the MSA. The MSA revenue and employment data was collected
from 2007 economic census, however, the BLS assisted in unmasking data points
that were not divulged to prevent individual firm identification. Once all the data
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points were unmasked, it was necessary to scale down the revenue data for each
industry to reflect each of the three regions actual composition of industries.
Table 31: Sample Region Data  Employment by Industry

Although the BLS provided actual data on employment for the three regions based
on composition and categorized by firm size (Table 3‐1), they were unable to
provide actual revenue numbers. In order to effectively use IMPLAN, the revenue
data from the MSA level needed to be scaled down to the regional level. This scaling
was conducted in two distinct functions: a constant economy of scale function and a
linear economy of scale function. The constant economy of scale function provides a
simple baseline, under the erroneous assumption that an employee in a given
industry produces the same revenue as any other employee in that industry. Under
the linear economy of scale function, employees in a larger firms produce more
revenue than their counterparts in smaller firms.

In order to build the constant economy of scale baseline a constant weight system
was developed based on ratio of employees in each size category to total employees
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Table 32: Sample Annual Revenue  MSA Level

within a given industry. This weight allowed distribution of the annual revenue
based on the given weights revealing approximate annual revenue based on
categorized firm sizes for each industry (Table 3‐2). Once the revenue was scaled to
the size categories at the MSA level, a second weight could be developed based on
the specific site to be tested. This scale used the ratio of employees in a given
category at the site‐specific level to the number of employees for the same industry
and size category at the MSA level. The totals for each industry were collected in
order to develop total annual revenues per industry, which could then be
compatible with the IMPLAN software to calculate total impact and output lost in
terms of both revenue and employees.

The simple constant economy of scale model does not accurately reflect the
complexities within an economic system. Economies of scale are the production and
cost advantages that a business obtains due to expansion and is a long run concept
referring to reductions in unit cost as the scale of the facility increases. These
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production and cost advantages may permit employees to be more productive or
reduce the overall cost and thus produce higher revenue per employee ratio when
compared with smaller firms in the same industry. In order to model economies of
scale, the weight system was modified to reflect a linear growth. Although the total
revenue per industry remained unchanged, the distribution of the revenue to the
different firm categories was no longer a simple weight. In order to build the model,
the following equations were used:
Equation 31

Equation 32

Understanding that the total revenue is the area under a curve, it is possible to build
a weight by taking the integral of a given portion of a curve and compare that to the
sum of the integrals of different portions of the curve (since the curve may not be
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continuous) to generate a weighting system which will allow larger firms to receive
a larger proportion of the revenue when compared to smaller firms.

Sector Coding
Once all businesses are classified by NAICS, IMPLAN further consolidates these
codes into sectors (Table 3‐3). IMPLAN has the ability to examine 509 different
Table 33: Sample IMPLAN Sector Scheme

IMPLAN
Sector IMPLAN Description
212
308
321

396
400
16
91

2007 NAICS

Photographic and photocopying equipment manufacturing 333315
Ophthalmic goods manufacturing
339115
Retail ‐ Furniture and home furnishings
Medical and diagnostic labs and outpatient and other
ambulatory care services

442XXX
6214XX, 6215XX, 6219XX

Individual and family services
Logging
Apparel accessories and other apparel manufacturing

6241XX
1133XX
3159XX

sectors of an economy. Sectors 1 through 494 are made up of NAICS coded
industries. In order to use the IMPLAN multipliers to determine direct, indirect and
induced effects, revenues need to be aggregated by sector. Then these revenue
totals may be calculated against the multipliers.

Sensitivity Analysis
In order to produce a range of impact estimates, the economy of scale was varied
between 1% and 100% in order to simulate the potential range of the impact based
on variations in a difficult‐to‐measure theoretical economic principle. Because the
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economy of scale is estimated as linear and broadly applied to all industries, there
will be an inherent inaccuracy. However, the variation of the data, which is critical in
order to provide civic leaders with a good estimate of the range of damage, will
emerge from such an analysis. Since economies of scale are not easily measured,
sensitivity analysis can show how the variation in the economies of scale will
quantitatively change the effects of an RDE within a region and provide a
distribution from which to calculate a confidence interval or range of the expected
effect of an RDE.

Seasonality Analysis
Simply stating that an RDE provides a simple annual impact does not provide the
full understanding of the impact of an RDE. In fact, the timing of the RDE is a critical
factor in maximizing the impact of the effects. In order to model seasonality,
monthly industry revenue data from 2007 was used to build monthly percentages
which could be applied to the revenue based on each region. This provides monthly
revenue data for each industry. Compiling the monthly revenue data provides a total
effect by month. In order to determine which month will result in the largest
economic impact, one must isolated the seasonal effects from the total effects. This
process required differencing the cumulative seasonal effects from the cumulative
non‐seasonal impact. By computing the area under the curve of the isolated
seasonal effects it is possible to determine which month(s) would result in the
largest added impact to a region above the non‐seasonal effects.
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Limitations
Although a powerful tool, IMPLAN is limited as an economic modeling tool only. It is
unable to account for costs resulting from cleanup, remediation efforts, or the
impact to residential property. These costs are expected to be a substantial burden
valued at “hundreds of millions of dollars per site.” (US Department of Homeland
Security, 2006) In addition, the economy is a dynamic entity while IMPLAN is using
static historical data to build its modeling system and thus may not be a good
predictor for future forecasts, however, because of the continuous updates to both
the data gathered by BLS and the I‐O Model from IMPLAN these drawbacks can be
minimized by conducting such an analysis on a recurring basis with the new
datasets and models. The benefit of using historical data to generate estimates is
that although the point estimate may be inaccurate, the calculated variance will
ensure with some confidence that the actual value will fall within the range of
predicted values.

Additionally, a linear representation of economies of scale is not perfect in modeling
actual economies of scale. However, a linear approximation is sufficient in its ability
to reflect the revenue distribution between small firms and large firms
proportionally within an economy. This distribution will allow for a more accurate
model, while the accuracy lost by not applying exponential economies of scale is not
substantial enough to warrant the added complication of more complex modeling.
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Although different sites of similar type will have different revenues based on both
actual revenue generated and factors associated with the location of the site within
the MSA, the added complexity and possible inability to model the location factors
would have made the model too unwieldy to accurately estimate the economic
impact of an RDE. As such, by selecting the largest (by overall revenue generated)
representative site for commercial, industrial, and retail districts within a city, the
analysis will produce the worst‐case scenario for each type of location (i.e., all
business districts, all retail centers, or all industrial areas) within the MSA.

Summary
Modeling the economic impact of an RDE required a number of critical assumptions,
from the size of the RDE to the type of RDD to modeling economies of scale and
location factors. In addition, by using established and recognized systems of
organization (NAICS) and analysis (IMPLAN) and following a systematic approach to
calculating the results, these results are repeatable and the method can be
generalized to other MSAs outside of Dayton. Although faced with a number of
limitations that the model was unable to capture, I believe the efficacy of the model
in predicting the impact cost of an RDE within any mid‐sized MSA to be sound.
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IV. Results and Analysis

The economic impact resulting from a simulated RDE attack within a mid‐sized city
is dependent on where the RDE occurs within the city. The direct, indirect, and
induced estimates vary based on the location and type of sectors affected. There is a
distinct difference in the impact of an RDE based on the location of the detonation;
the CBD, a retail center (Fairfield Mall) or an industrial area (Moraine GM plant) all
produce markedly different results. In addition, the month of detonation plays a
critical role in maximizing economic impact, which unsurprisingly is dependent on
the location of the RDE.

Initial Results
The initial results of this analysis showed that over a 1‐year period, while holding
economies of scale constant, the economic impact of an RDE is as follows:
Table 41: Mean Revenue Impact due to RDE

Mean Revenue Impact ($ Millions)
Direct Effect
Indirect Effect
Induced Effect
Total Effect

Central Business District
$840.1
$250.8
$327.2
$1,418.0

Moraine
696.5
$168.4
$236.4
$1,101.3

Fairfield Mall
$522.1
$137.8
$231.1
$891.0

Table 42: Employment Impact Due to RDE

Employment Impact
Direct Effect
Indirect Effect
Induced Effect
Total Effect

Central Business District
18,137
46,020
66,837
130,994
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Moraine
20,248
43,737
55,167
119,152

Fairfield Mall
12,156
28,143
46,562
86,861

Sensitivity Analysis
By varying the economy of scale component of the revenue distribution function, it
is possible to develop a range of effects. The economy of scale determines how much
more revenue a large firm generates compared to a small firm. As such, by varying
the economy of scale from 1% to 100%, we generate the following ranges:
Table 43: Range of Economic Impact by varying Economy of Scale

Direct Effect
Min
Max
CBD
$812.8 $883.9
Moraine
$683.8 $710.4
Fairfield Mall $498.2 $538.8

Effect Range for RDE ($ Millions)
Indirect Effect Induced Effect
Total Effect
Min
Max
Min
Max
Min
Max
$244.9 $260.9 $315.2 $345.6 $1,373.0 $1,490.3
$166.5 $170.2 $232.0 $242.0 $1,082.3 $1,122.6
$131.1 $142.4 $221.1 $238.2 $850.4
$919.4

Since each of these regions is composed of numerous industries, it is possible to
develop a confidence interval by using Chebyshev’s rule (Equation 4‐1) for any
distribution of revenue for each of the effects (direct, indirect and induced) (Figure
4‐1), as well as for the total effect. (Figure 4‐2) Chebyshev’s rule allows the
construction of confidence intervals of at least 89% for any distribution using the
mean and standard deviation of the data with the following formula:
Equation 41
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Figure 41: Confidence Interval of Economic Impact by Effect Type

Figure 42: Confidence Interval of Total Economic Impact by Region
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Central Business District
Within the CBD, we see the most variation, the majority of which comes from the
direct effect. The induced and indirect effects are more contained and as such offset
the variation seen within the CBD. Plotting the curve of the effect over the
percentage of economy of scale, we can see the breadth of range contained within
the CBD. (Figure 4‐3)

Figure 43: Total Effect in Central Business District with variations to Economy of Scale

This curve clearly illustrates the range of possible outcomes for the Central Business
District as the economy of scale shifts between 1% and 100%. The depth of this
variation occurs because the composition of the CBD is predominantly composed of
firms that can either afford the high costs of operation (rent) within the downtown
area or are firms who maintain a small commercial operation and can afford to
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remain in the CBD despite the high operating cost. As a result, the composition of
the first group (firms which can afford the high cost) is typically corporate offices
which are considered mid‐size to large based on the number of employees. The
composition of the second group (firms which are small enough to not incur high
operating costs) is small businesses with few employees. Additionally, since these
firms are in many varied industries, they can be considered competitors as opposed
to complementary producers.

A complementary firm is one that produces a product to support or in conjunction
with another related firm (i.e., automobile assembly plant and brake manufacturing
plant), while competitors are vying for business against each other (i.e., four or five
small accounting firms competing with one mid‐sized corporate accounting firm).
Although there are numerous industries within the CBD, there are enough firms
collocated that competition is prevalent. Therefore, as the economy of scale is
varied, the shifts are magnified because of the variety of different sized firms in
competing industries within the CBD.

Moraine
Moraine is a major industrial center and contains the GM assembly plant. Although
the curve (Figure 4‐4) is of a similar shape as the CBD curve, the actual variation
within Moraine is minimal when compared with the other two sites. This is a result
of the narrow diversity and large size of the firms in the area. Moraine was built
around the GM assembly plant. The area primarily consists of a small number of
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large firms in related industries (complementary producers), although there are
some small firms within the area in unrelated business such as fast food restaurants,
barber shops, gas stations etc, these firms are not competitors of the primary
industry (the automotive industry) within the region. Rather, they are services
dependent on the main industry. Therefore, as the economy of scale varies, the large
related firms only experience a slight shift in revenue since they have no direct
competitors within the region or MSA, resulting in less variation of revenue lost.

Additionally, the curve of the revenue line in Figure 4‐4 is more linear in appearance
than the CBD curve. This again can be attributed to the composition of industries
within the Moraine region being complimentary instead of competitive as well as

Figure 44: Total Effect in Industrial Region (Moraine) with variations to Economy of Scale
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the lack of variety in size. There are a distinct number of small firms and a few very
large firms but there are almost no firms within the mid‐size range. This could
possible contribute to the curves linear appearance while the economy of scale
percentage remains large, but as the economy of scale is below 25%, the curve
captures a more parabolic appearance.

Fairfield Mall
The Fairfield Mall is the least impacted of the three regions. The variation of this
region is less than the CBD but greater than Moraine and is driven primarily by the
direct effect. However, the indirect and induced effects should not be discounted as

Figure 45: Total Effect in Retail Region (Fairfield Mall) with variations to Economy of Scale

they contribute significantly to the variation as well. In addition to having such
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variation, the Revenue Lost to Economy of Scale plot (Figure 4‐5) is unique in its
curvature. The curve is slightly convex, unlike the curves for the CBD or Moraine,
indicating that there are diminishing revenue reductions for the Fairfield Mall as the
economy of scale is increased.

Furthermore, the Fairfield Mall was the previous study site of a simulated RDE
attack. (LeBrun, 2009) The results of that study found a total impact of $1.2 billion
(BY2003) and 21,374 jobs impacted. Because the revenue of LeBrun’s study is
within the same frame of reference as the estimates from this research, it is a strong
indication that the measure of $891M (BY2007) is a good estimate. While these
results are still within the same scope as LeBrun’s findings for the Fairfield Mall,
they differ significantly. There are a number of factors that may have caused
LeBrun’s estimate to be over $300 million greater then the results of this study.

LeBrun built his estimates based on square footage of a retail center and the known
relationship of revenue per square foot while I used data generated from the BLS at
the MSA level and scaled down to the regional level. The three largest sectors in
LeBrun’s model (which accounted for almost 25% of the estimated revenue) had
decreased their revenue significantly between 2003 and 2007. In addition to having
the revenue decrease, the IMPLAN multipliers from the model had also shifted
downward between 2003 and 2007 by almost 50% for those three sectors. The
changes in the growth of the economy (the beginning of a recession) shifted the
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multipliers used in this study downward when compared to LeBrun’s and this
account for the difference between our results.

Seasonality Analysis
The results generated from the seasonality analysis conducted for each of the
regions revealed some surprising results in regards to which month resulted in the
greatest economic impact on the affected region as well as volatility of the seasonal
effects for each region.

Figure 46: Seasonal Impact by Month of RDE
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Central Business District
Over the 12‐month period of data from 2007, it is possible to determine which
month will cause the largest economic impact from an RDE. In order to easily
quantify this, the cumulative seasonality effects on the revenue must first be
isolated. Differencing the cumulative seasonality revenues from the cumulative
monthly revenue, assuming no seasonality exists, provides us with a clear cut time
series of the effect of seasonality (Figure 4‐7)

Figure 47: Season Effects of the RDE in the CBD – attack occurs in Month 1
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By evaluating the area under the curve, we can determine the total net effect of
when the RDE occurs compared to an event without considering seasonality. An
original assumption was that the month of most impact would be October,
November, or December, which is generally when retail businesses have the most
sales. However, the results are quite unexpected: within the CBD, the summer
months (June, July or August) result in the largest economic impact. Overall, an
attack in June would result in and additional $6.7 million in economic losses above
the cumulative (non‐seasonal) average. Conversely, an attack in December would
net $9.4 million below the cumulative average.

The variation is strictly considering seasonality; however, why does an RDE in the
summer months produce results above the non‐seasonal average? Summer is the
time major construction projects are started throughout the United States ranging
from simple home construction to larger undertakings such as infrastructure
projects. Although there are a number of firms within the CBD related to
construction and facilities maintenance, there are also a number of supporting
industries collocated in the CBD as well such as accountants, attorneys,
telecommunication specialists, and realtors. This keeps the seasonal income above
the non‐seasonal average through the summer and until the fall where the major
revenue spike occurs. If the RDE occurred in the fall, the impact will be less. An RDD
detonation in winter gives a below average result as the potential extra impact from
the summer and fall will not be materialized.
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However, this seasonality effect is not significant when compared to the magnitude
of the effect as a whole. For the CBD, an additional $6.7 million loss would occur at
the peak month. When compared to the $1.4 billion that will be impacted in the CBD,
an additional $6.7 million will hardly be noticed and will get absorbed into the
larger figure. However, seasonality is still a factor not just because of the added
value, but also because of the heightened potential of when an attack might occur
and must be considered as part of the analysis.

Moraine
Similarly to the CBD, the month of the largest economic impact of an RDE in the
industrial center is July. (Figure 4‐8) The worst month for an RDE in Moraine is July;

Figure 48: Season Effects of the RDE in Moraine (Industrial Area) – attack occurs in Month 1
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the impact will be $14 million above the non‐seasonal average.

The automotive industry, which is a significant portion of the industry base in
Moraine, is seasonal. Historically, the automotive industry as a whole has always
had two peaks, one in the spring (May and June) with a secondary peak in October
and a trough in December. (Kuznets, 1975) However, these peaks are for the
industry as a whole and are a composite of the production runs from the major
automotive groups. Since industries in Moraine are focused around the GM
automotive plant, it is critical to understand the GM production season. General
Motors runs its peak production in October (producing 93,000 vehicles in October
2007) and has a trough in July (producing only 52,000 vehicles in July 2007).
(General Motors Corporation, 2007). However, because a number of supporting
industries are collocated with the GM plant, production in July is starting to increase
in intensity, ensuring the month of July is above average. Once GM begins its peak
production push in September through December, it is already too late for an RDE to
cause an above average effect. An attack in July will produce a $14 million above
average impact while an attack in December will result in an impact $12 million
below average for the Moraine region.

Similar to the CBD, the total effect within Moraine is so large ($1.1 billion) that $14
million above the average impact would be very small. These seasonal effects are so
insignificant that they fall within the range of confidence for each of the sites.
However, it is important to note that despite their relatively small size, and all other
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factors being equal, the seasonal factor may be an indication of which months a
terrorist will choose to attack and ultimately for us, which months security should
be increased and vigilance heightened.

Fairfield Mall
Upon examination of the seasonality effect, it is apparent that the Fairfield Mall is
again unique from the CBD or Moraine. (Figure 4‐9) Unlike the CBD or Moraine, the

Figure 49: Season Effects of the RDE in the Fairfield Mall (Retail Area) – attack occurs in Month 1
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Fairfield Mall appears to follow conventional thought on which month, if an RDE
occurred, would result in the largest impact. An attack occurring in October would
result in the largest the impact on the economy.

October is the start of the peak period of consumer purchases; most retail stores
make the majority of their annual revenue in October, November and December. A
detonation of an RDE within the Fairfield Mall area would easily disrupt those peak
months. The retail sector appears to have a sharp increase in the fall months and a
steady decrease throughout the rest of the year, unlike the CBD and Moraine, which
held a gradual increase until a peak period followed by a gradual decrease.

An attack occurring in October will net an above average effect of $51 million while
an attack in January, immediately after the peak season, will have effects $70 million
below the non‐seasonal average.

Relationship Between Number of Firms and Total Impact
There seems to be a relationship between the estimated economic impact of an RDE
within an urban environment and the number of firms impacted by the area. (Table
4‐4) Given the assumption that the only information known is restricted to the total
annual revenue within the MSA, the total numbers of firms within the MSA, and the
number of firms within the selected region for analysis, it is possible to estimate the
impact.
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Table 44: Estimation of Economic Impact by Number of Firms

In order to develop a rough approximation of the total impact of an area, the first
step needed is finding the average revenue per firm for the MSA using the following
formula:
Equation 42

Using this average from Equation 4‐2, we can begin to estimate the direct effects of a
RDE by multiplying Equation 4‐2 by the number of firms in the study site and
factoring in the location factor for the site in question.
Equation 43

The Average Revenue per Firm (AR/F) is the result of Equation 4‐2; the number of
firms within the study region is obtained from public records. The Location Factor
(LF) is determined by the percentage of revenue conducted within the study site
when compared to the average revenue of other similar regions. For example, in this
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study, the CBD produced 50% more revenue than the average business district and
a factor of 1.5 was applied as the location factor.

Once the direct effect is determined, calculating the indirect and induced effects
require estimating an Effect Factor (EF) of the average revenue per firm (Equation
4‐2).

In the case of Dayton, Ohio, I estimated that the indirect effect was approximately
30% of the average revenue per firm and the induced effects were approximately
40%. These percentages were derived by taking a weighted average of the IMPLAN
multipliers (indirect and induced), weighted by the IMPLAN sectors within the MSA,
which produced an average of .3 and .4 respectively. Once applied, Equation 4‐2 can
be used to calculate the indirect and induced effects. A generalized version of
Equation 4‐2 can be found below: (Equation 4‐4)

Equation 44

The total effect of an RDE attack can then be estimated by the summation of the
direct, indirect and induced effects.

Implications
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The numbers generated by following these formulas are strictly an approximation
and should not be used in lieu of the methodology outlined in chapter 3 to generate
an estimate. Rather, this method highlights a previously unknown relationship
between the number of firms within an industry and the total effects of the study
site. This relationship highlights that for an urban center with limited resources,
protecting the site or sites of highly congested areas such as the CBD will provide
the best amount of protection for dollar spent. Additionally, this quick method may
validate the results generated from the more accurate and complex method to
ensure the estimates are correct. This unexpected relationship is inherently
valuable as a tool to validate estimates generated from the method developed by
this study.
Examining the Central Business District
The CBD is, without any doubt, the area that will be the most effected by an RDE.
This is not an unexpected result as is does follow convention that the CBD which is
the heart of the MSA will contain the largest amount of revenue in any given area
and by disrupting the CBD, the greatest impact would occur. The CBD contains more
firms within the same area than anywhere else within the MSA. It is considered the
nerve center of any city and contains the primary commercial center. In the event
of an RDE, the total annual economic impact for Dayton, OH will be approximately
$1.4 billion dollars, affecting 18,000 people directly and 113,000 from indirect and
induced effects. The total effect on annual revenue is disaggregated into direct,
indirect and induced effects. (Table 4‐5)
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Table 45: Direct, Indirect, Induced and Total Effects for CBD

($ Millions)
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect
Mean
$839.7
$250.7
$327.1
$1,417.5
Confidence Interval
±$61.0
±$13.8
±$26.6
±$101.3
CI89
In addition to being the most impacted area for an RDE, the CBD contains numerous
public buildings such as courthouses, libraries and city hall. The CBD is also an area
of high vehicular and pedestrian traffic and contains numerous public
transportation nodes allowing (low‐income) individuals without a personal vehicle
access to and from city suburbs. An impact to this area will not be only economically
devastating, but will devastate the entirety of the MSA; an attack in the CBD will
disrupt the citywide traffic flow, hamper coordination of public services (fire, police,
medical) and restrict the movements of the MSA residents as well as goods and
services throughout the city.

The effects measured in this study are based strictly on revenue in order to facilitate
a comparison between regions. It is difficult to quantify the benefits public
government has provided and as such it was excluded from the analysis. It should be
recognized that an RDE within the CBD will be much more devastating than the
estimated impact because of the geographic structure of a city around the CBD.
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V. Discussion and Conclusion

Many opportunities are available for future researchers to build upon this study as
well as to improve it. The following chapter discusses limitations,
recommendations, and areas for further research. However, before we can consider
the limits of this study and future areas of research, it is critical to understand the
methods used and highlight the critical results obtained from my analysis.

Methods Used
Modeling the economic impact of an RDE required critical information. This study
used datasets from the BLS to generate the number of firms and revenue of those
firms within three distinct areas of the MSA – the Central Business District
(Commercial Center), the Moraine GM Plant (Industrial Center) and the Fairfield
Mall (Retail Center). In order to effectively analyze each area, the total revenue
effects were calculated via IMPLAN multipliers. IMPLAN is analysis software
package that generates a series of multipliers for each sector of industries based on
their interrelationships with other industries and within the MSA, known as Input‐
Output Modeling. Multipliers are a numeric way of describing the impact of a change
to the revenue or employment levels. The multipliers allow calculation of the direct,
indirect, and induced effects of a change to the revenue or employment level. In
addition, the summation of these three effects shows the total impact to the MSA
based on a change in revenue or employment. Prior studies have only been able to
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calculate the direct effect and as such have not accounted for a substantial effect of
the economic impact

In order for this model to be usable as a tool for decision‐makers, I had to make
certain assumptions. I assumed the size and type of the contamination area as well
as linear economies of scale. I did not consider location factors with regard to
computing the model results although location factors were needed to develop the
estimate based strictly on firm density within an area. These assumptions will not
impact the methodology nor change the overall outcome of this study.

Critical Results and Discussion
Following a systematic approach, I was able to develop some very interesting
results. This process is repeatable and the method can be generalized to other MSAs.
Ultimately, the effects of any RDE of the size described in NPS Scenario 11 will be
devastating.

Area of Greatest Impact
The most substantial impact will occur if an RDD is detonated within the Central
Business District (CBD). Such an attack within the CBD will result in a total effect of
$1.4 billion (BY2007) over a 1‐year period. The seasonality factor determines the
time of year an attack will have the most impact. The summer months of June, July,
and August produce the greatest seasonal effects, while an attack in December or
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January would reduce the impact below the calculated non‐seasonal average.
Although the CBD contains the largest impact to the MSA, attacks in Moraine or
Fairfield Mall should not be discounted, as they will have a 1‐year total effect of $1.1
billion and $900 million respectively.

Relationships in Direct, Indirect, and Induced Effects
The ratios of direct to indirect to induced effects remained fairly consistent at all
three sites within this study at 60%, 15%, and 25%, respectively. Interestingly, out
of the total effect, 40% is not immediately realized (indirect and induced effects).
This is because indirect and induced effects are time‐lagging effects. These effects
will be realized months after the RDE. Not considering the indirect and induced
effects often results in a broad underestimation of the effects at all levels of
government. In the case of an RDD detonation, the impacted area would require the
assistance of Federal government aid through the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). This type of analysis will help FEMA determine the level of
assistance required and will improve future cost estimates. From previous studies,
the process used to estimate future‐year funding to be appropriated by Congress is
often underestimated.

FEMA uses the 5‐year annual average level of obligations for past disasters, adjusted
for inflation, as its estimate of the total cost of disasters anticipated to occur during
the current fiscal year. The costs used to develop the five‐year average are taken
from the required cost‐estimate conducted within 90 days after the declaration of
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disaster. This cost estimate is strictly a measure of the direct effects, as the indirect
and induced effects are lagging and their economic impacts are not yet evident and
not considered in the estimation of future financial needs.

To estimate when during the year the disasters will occur, FEMA simply allows the
five‐year annual average to decline at a constant rate (8 percent) each month during
the fiscal year, with no model for seasonality. As a result, the Federal government is
not only measuring the direct effects of a disaster (which only accounts for 60% of
the total economic impact), but they are regularly underestimating the cost of
disaster events due to seasonality factors. This underestimation by FEMA results in
an annually underestimated congressional appropriation. As a final result, an RDE
attack will not only devastate the region attacked, but will also require additional
unplanned appropriations, adding to our ever‐growing national debt.

“Ball Park” Estimates
During this analysis there was discovered a relationship between the number of
firms in an area and the magnitude of the economic impact. This means that there is
an inherent process available to validate the estimates generated via the
methodology outlined in this research.

It is imperative that civic leaders at all levels use this information to preemptively
protect the densest areas of our cities. Underestimating our adversaries is our
greatest weakness as a nation and is exploited without hesitation.
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Limitations
InputOutput Models
While IMPLAN does a good job at estimating economic impacts to output and
employment, the software does have limitations. The economy is a dynamic and
complex entity with economic data constantly changing. However, in order to
generate I‐O Models, IMPLAN utilizes historic economic data to build its models and
multipliers (2007 economic data). Additionally, IMPLAN is unable to account for
costs resulting from immediate actions such as cleanup or remediation efforts.
Additionally, the model does not account for the impact to residential property
values nor the residual costs associated with psychological factors or the potential
exodus of people from the impacted area and its impact on the economy. These
costs are expected to be a substantial burden valued at “hundreds of millions of
dollars per site.” (US Department of Homeland Security, 2006)

Economies of Scale
Actual economies of scale are generally not linear; rather, are some form of
geometric or exponential growth curve. This study used a linear approximation for
the economies of scale in order to confirm a difference between a method that
accounts for economies of scale and one that does not. Future analysis using this
study’s methods must include a factor for economies of scale. Any estimate, which
holds economies of scale constant, will not accurately predict the economic impact
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of a district within an MSA. Within the context of this study, it is sufficient in its
ability to reflect the revenue distribution between small firms and large firms
proportionally via a linear approximation. This linear approximation allowed for a
more accurate model, while the accuracy lost by not applying exponential curves to
economies of scale is not substantial enough to warrant the added complication of
more complex modeling.

Location Factors
Different sites of similar type will have varying revenues based on both actual
revenue generated and factors associated with the location of the site within the
MSA. However by selecting the largest site of each type district, this study has
provided an upper bound for RDE analysis.

Recommendations
As illustrated within this research, the economic fallout resulting from an RDE has
the potential to be quite costly. Therefore, officials and planners at all levels of
government must assume a proactive posture when dealing with the threat. The
methodology outlined within this research serves as a tool that planners and
officials in any location can use in order to facilitate the planning and decision‐
making process. Through informed decision making and strategic planning, leaders
can make effective decisions as to what preventive measures should be in place or
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how resources should be optimally allocated among competing options in the event
of a RDE occurring within their area.

An economic impact analysis allows key stakeholders to attain a better
understanding of the possible magnitudes and ranges of possible economic impacts
resulting from a RDE. As a result, leaders can better determine where to allocate
limited resources to prevent and deter an RDE attack. If recovery and resiliency to
an RDE is to be maximized, effective and efficient planning is critical.

Future Research
This study focused solely on quantifying commercial economic impacts resulting
from a RDE. Other economic parameters, such as cleanup and remediation costs, or
residential considerations were not taken into account. Realistically, the overall
economic impacts would have been higher if these additional parameters were
included within the economic impact calculations.

Additionally, repeated iterations of the methodology in various MSAs will provide
new insights into the effects and interactions between distinct intra‐city regions and
provide a further validation of this research.

This study was unable to account for local government revenue lost due to the
impact. It is possible to measure these effects with business tax multipliers. By
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including these effects, a better picture would be presented as to the impact total to
government income.

Conclusion
This research examined the economic impacts of a RDE on the three distinct regions
of a mid‐sized urban economy. The methodology outlined within this composition
is unique in that it aids in the RDE response effort by providing government
planners, officials, and key stakeholders with an economic impact assessment
method. This process can be used by any city throughout the United States to
determine the effects (direct, indirect, and induced) that an RDE would have on the
economy. Furthermore, this study identified a relationship between the effect of the
impact and the density of firms surrounding the RDE. This relationship is important
because it helps facilitate planning as well as effective and efficient decision making
in response to the threat. As a result, preventive measures can be in place,
resources efficiently allocated, and recovery and resiliency maximized before the
RDE occurs. This is the true value of this research.
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